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Abstract
We address the problem of locating facilities on the [0, 1] interval based on reports from strategic
agents. The cost of each agent is her distance to the closest facility, and the global objective is to
minimize either the maximum cost of an agent or the social cost.
As opposed to the extensive literature on facility location which considers the multiplicative error,
we focus on minimizing the worst-case additive error. Minimizing the additive error incentivizes
mechanisms to adapt to the size of the instance. I.e., mechanisms can sacrifice little efficiency in small
instances (location profiles in which all agents are relatively close to one another), in order to gain
more [absolute] efficiency in large instances. We argue that this measure is better suited for many
manifestations of the facility location problem in various domains.
We present tight bounds for mechanisms locating a single facility in both deterministic and ran-
domized cases. We further provide several extensions for locating multiple facilities.
1 Introduction
We consider a setting in which several agents are located on a line, and a central planner intends to
place a facility at some point upon that line. Each of the agents seeks to be as close as possible to the
facility – the cost of an agent is her distance to the facility. The planner wishes to minimize some global
objective – either the average or the maximum cost of an agent. In some cases, agents might misreport
their preference in order to obtain a better outcome from their perspective. We aim to devise truthful
mechanisms, in which no agent can benefit from misreporting, regardless of the reports of the other
agents.
In the literature, the most common measure for assessing a mechanism’s efficiency is the approxima-
tion ratio – the worst-case ratio (over any location profile) between the global cost of the mechanism and
that of the optimal mechanism. In this paper, we strive to minimize the additive error – the worst-case
difference between the same two values.
To illustrate the difference between these two error functions, consider the classical facility location
problem in which a municipality wants to build a library on one of its streets in order to serve the residents
of the street. Optimizing over the approximation ratio might guarantee, for instance, that no resident will
need to walk to the library more than 2 times the maximal walking distance of an agent in the optimal
assignment. In contrast, optimizing over the additive error might guarantee that no agent will need to
walk to the library for more than 3 kilometers over the optimal assignment. This example demonstrates
that optimizing over the additive error guarantees efficiency with respect to a tangible and natural measure
of absolute distance, and further provides a target function which is easily understood.
As opposed to the multiplicative error which is scale-invariant, by focusing on the additive error we
sacrifice some efficiency in small instances (e.g., cases in which all residents are close to the library), in
which the solutions are already quite good, so as to achieve a nearly optimal solution in larger instances
(where the error is significantly higher). Indeed, in many cases some (large) instances are more important
to the designer than other (smaller) instances, and the additive error accommodates for this need.
Clearly, when the size of the instance doubles, the additive error also doubles. However, in many
different manifestations of the facility location problem, the domains are bounded. We restrict ourselves
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to such cases, i.e., in our setting the network is not R, but rather the [0, 1] segment of the line. Some
examples of such settings include:
– In the aforementioned example of locating a public library on a street, there is clearly a realistic bound
on the length of a street, e.g., the length of the longest street in the city.
– A group of public officials needs to vote over the amount of resources to invest in a given policy
(political, social, etc.). E.g., the Ministry of Education is faced with the decision of how much money
the government should allocate to a reform in the school system. Note that in this case scaling can
be done with respect to the size of the total education budget, since decisions which affect millions of
dollars tend to be more important than those which affect thousands of dollars.
– A group of people sitting in a room want to collectively decide on the temperature of the air conditioner.
Each person has their own ideal temperature, and some reasonable assumptions can be used to bound
the minimal and maximal temperature values (e.g., it is probably safe to assume that nobody’s true
preference is 100 degrees Celsius).
– A group of colleagues wishes to set up a meeting in the upcoming week, and each one has an ideal
time slot for the meeting. In some cases it is assumed that the utility function is single-peaked (see,
e.g., [25]). In this example, time provides a natural scale for the problem and it seems reasonable to get
solutions where everybody waits at most 5 minutes more than the optimal, even if the optimal solution
is 0. In contrast, if the optimal solution is 3 hours, a 2 approximation can be very bad.
Assuming quasi-linear utilities and allowing payments, then the well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism is truthful and can achieve the optimal social cost (e.g., [17]). However, in many
real-life situations (such as in the examples previously mentioned) we restrict the use of money due to
ethical, legal or other considerations.
Given a set of votes, it is polytime to find the optimal outcome. However, when restricted to truthful
mechanisms, we show that the optimal result cannot be selected in the general case. In other words,
approximation is used to circumvent truthfulness and not computational hardness.
1.1 Our Contributions
We analyze the worst-case additive error between truthful mechanisms and the optimal mechanism for
two objectives - the maximum cost and the average cost of an agent. The average cost is the same as the
more commonly used objective of the social cost up to a multiplicative factor of n (the amount of agents),
and we chose to focus on the average cost purely due to convenience as the results are easier to interpret
without the parameter n.
It In Observation 2, we show that the error for the average cost grows at least linearly with n. Using
this normalization, it is clear that since the network is the [0, 1] line, the additive error for both the
average cost and the maximum cost of any mechanism is always between 0 and 1. For example, the
trivial mechanism which locates the facility at 1/2 regardless of the agents’ reports has an additive error
of 1/2 for both the social and maximum cost. Our choice of an interval length of 1 is only done for
the sake on convenience, and our results hold without loss of generality for any interval [0,M ] with an
obvious multiplicative adjustment of the ratios (e.g., M/6 instead of 1/6).
In the paper, we show the following results:
– Locating a single facility (Figure 1) - We provide tight bounds for all variations of this problem. For
the average cost, it is well known that locating the facility on the median report is both truthful and
optimal. For the maximum cost, we start by presenting a randomized lower bound of 1/6. In order
to do so, we characterize the structure of the optimal mechanism, and show that it must locate the
facility at one of five possible points (the leftmost and rightmost reports, the center between them, 0
and 1). We further show that it must be symmetric (a notion we formally define in the paper). We then
present two location profiles, and utilize this characterization to exhibit the lower bound. We move on
to devise a mechanism called BLRC, which is a probability distribution over two known mechanisms,
that matches the lower bound of 1/6. In contrast, the best upper bound of currently known mechanisms
was 1/4 (LRC: left-right-center by [23]).
For deterministic mechanisms, we show a lower bound of 1/4. We then present a simple deterministic
mechanism called phantom-half that matches this bound. In contrast, the best upper bound of any
dictatorship is 1/2.
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Figure 1: Our results for single facility problem with the maximum cost objective. We show tight
bounds of 1/6 for randomized mechanisms and 1/4 for deterministic mechanisms. The best results
for currently known mechanisms were 1/4 and 1/2 for randomized and deterministic mechanisms
respectively.
Randomized Deterministic
Lower 1/6 1/4
Bound Thm. 5 Thm. 15
Upper 1/6 1/4
Bound BLRC, Thm. 12 Phantom-half, Thm. 17
Known 1/4 1/2
Mechanisms LRC (from [23]) Any dictatorship
– Extensions to multiple facilities - We first show a trivial mechanism, Equal Spread, which locates k
facilities with equal distances from one another (without using the instance data) and has a maximum
cost of 12k−1 . We then extend the construction of the deterministic lower bound for one facility to the
multiple-facility setting, and reach a lower bound of 16k , which shows that the result for this problem
is Θ(1/k).
For the average cost, we present two extensions to Equal Spread which slightly improve the error -
the randomized paired-equal-cost (PEC) which has an error of 14k−2 (Theorem 22) and the determin-
istic election-parity-equal-cost (EPEC) mechanism which reaches an error of 38k−4 (Theorem 23). In
addition, for the special case of 2 facilities, we show a deterministic mechanism based on percentiles
which achieves an upper bound of 1/5 (compared to 1/4 by EPEC).
1.2 Related Work
The truthful facility location problem has rich roots. The initial focus was mainly on characterizing the
class of truthful mechanisms - in 1980 Moulin characterized all deterministic truthful mechanisms for
locating a facility on the line, when the preferences are single-peaked [20], and this characterization was
later extended to general graphs by Schummer and Vohra [25].
Procaccia and Tennenholtz were the first to prove bounds on the approximation ratio of the game-
theoretic facility location problem [23]. Their initial model has been extended by these authors and by
others in many ways, and most of these extensions leads to additional bounds on the approximation
ratio — The network was extended from the line to cycles ([1], [2]), trees ([1], [11]) and general graphs
[1]; Some papers consider building several facilities, where the cost of an agent is her distance to the
closest facility (e.g. [19], [18], [14], [15]); Other papers look at heterogeneous facilities, i.e., facilities
serving different purposes [26]; Several papers consider a setting in which every agent possesses multiple
locations and pays the sum of the distances to her locations ([23], [19]); Additional objective functions
were considered besides the maximum cost and the social cost, for instance the L2 norm [11] or the
minimax envy [6] (in the latter, the approximation was done with an additive error); Additional papers
consider different preferences of the agents, for instance doubly-peaked preferences [12], “obnoxious
facility location” in which agents want to be as far away as possible from the facility [7], settings which
combine agents with ordinary preferences and agents who wish to be far from the facility ([9], [28]);
Another direction that was researched is the tradeoff between the approximation ratio and the variance
([24]); Some papers consider different methods of voting, for instance by restricting the outcome to a
discrete set of candidates ([8], [27], [10]) or by using mediators [5]. When restricting the location of the
facility to given candidates, minimizing the social cost of facility location problems has been associated
to the notion of “distortion” ([22], [3], [10], [4], [16]).
Nissim et. al. also use additive errors for facility location, as an example of their framework which
maintains differential privacy [21]. However, their model differs from our setting as they grant the mech-
anism the additional power to impose agents to connect to a specific facility. Imposition allows for better
approximation ratios, as seen for instance in [13].
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2 Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents, where each agent i ∈ N is located at some point xi ∈ [0, 1].
The vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) is known as a location profile. A deterministic mechanism for locating k
facilities is a mapping from some location profile (the reports of the agents) to a set of k points on the
interval (the chosen locations of the facilities), that is: M : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]k.
Assuming the facility locations are M(x) = {l1, . . . , lk}, the cost of point p is its distance to the
closest facility: costp(M,x) = min1≤j≤k |lj − p|. The cost of agent i located at xi is defined as the cost
of her location, costxi(M,x). Each agent aims to minimize her cost.
A randomized mechanism is a mapping from a location profile to some distribution over k-tuples of
locations: M : [0, 1]n → ∆([0, 1]k). The cost of agent i is the expected cost of this agent according to the
probability distribution returned by the mechanism, that is: costxi(M,x) = E(l1,...,lk)∼M(x) minj |xi −
lj |.
A truthful mechanism M (also known as a strategyproof mechanism) is one in which an arbitrary
agent cannot suffer from reporting her real location, regardless of the reports of the other agents: For all
i ∈ N , all xi, x′i ∈ [0, 1] and x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1:
costxi(M, (xi,x−i)) ≤ costxi(M, (x
′
i,x−i)).
For randomized mechanisms, these mechanisms are often denoted by the term truthful in expectation
mechanisms, in order to distinguish them from universally truthful mechanisms (a stronger notion which
we do not use in this paper, in which an agent cannot regret reporting her true location ex-post).
For a location profile x and reported locations x′ the average cost is: AC(M,x,x′) =
1
n
∑
i costxi(M,x
′). Note that we scale the sum of the agents’ costs by a factor of n. For truthful
mechanisms, we can drop the misreport in the notation and denote the average cost by AC(M,x). Given
a location profile x, the optimal average cost is: AC(OPT,x) = min(l1...lk)∈[0,1]k
1
n
∑
iminj |lj − xi|.
For a truthful mechanismM , the additive error given a location profile x is the difference between the av-
erage cost of M and the average cost of the optimal mechanism: σM (x) = AC(M,x) −AC(OPT,x).
The additive error of a truthful mechanism M is the maximal error over any location profile: σM =
maxx σM (x).
Given location profile x and reported locations x′ the maximum cost (max-cost in short) is:
MC(M,x,x′) = maxi costxi(M,x
′). Similarly to the average cost case, for a truthful mechanism
M we denote the max-cost by MC(M,x). Given a location profile x, the optimal maximum cost is:
MC(OPT,x) = min
(l1...lk)∈[0,1]k
max
i
min
j
|lj − xi|
For a truthful mechanism M , the additive error given a location profile x is the difference between
the maximum cost of M and the maximal cost of the optimal mechanism: δM (x) = MC(M,x) −
MC(OPT,x). The additive error of a truthful mechanism M is the maximal error over any location
profile: δM = maxx δM (x).
Given a location profile x, we denote the leftmost and rightmost points in x by xL and xR respec-
tively. The center point between these two points is called xC = xL+xR2 .
We now show that lower bounds proven for few agents can also be extended to location profiles
with arbitrarily many agents since the error grows at least linearly with the amount of agents. The first
observation shows that any lower bound for both the maximum and average cost proven with a location
profile with n agents also holds for any profile with q · n agents for an arbitrary positive integer q (i.e.,
for any profile with an even number of agents).
Observation 1. Let M be a truthful mechanism which has an additive error of ǫ for any profile with q ·n
agents for some global cost function (either the maximum or the average cost) with q ≥ 1. Then there
exists some truthful mechanism M ′ which has an additive error of ǫ for the same global cost function,
for any profile with n agents.
Proof. Let M ′ be the mechanism which simulates M based on the location profile which duplicates each
report q times. That is, for some input xA = (xA1 , . . . , xAn ), M ′ creates the profile
xB = (x
B
1 = x
B
2 = · · · = x
B
q = x
A
1 , x
B
q+1 = x
B
q+2 = · · · = x
B
2q = x
A
2 , · · · , x
B
(n−1)q+1 =
xB(n−1)q+2 = · · · = x
B
nq = x
A
n ) and locates the facilities on M ′(xA) = M(xB).
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In these profiles in which the profile is duplicated, the additive error of these mechanisms is the same
(and therefore in the general case, the cost of M is at least as large as that of M ′): for the maximum cost
it holds that:
MC(M ′,xA) = max
i
|xAi −M
′(xA)|
= max
j
|xBj −M(xB)| = MC(M,xB).
For the average cost, both the numerator and the denominator are multiplied by q:
AC(M ′,xA) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|xAi −M
′(xA)|
=
1
qn
qn∑
j=1
|xBj −M(xB)| = MC(M,xB).
Clearly, the cost of the optimal mechanism is the same for both of these cases as well.
It is only left to prove truthfulness under M ′. This holds due to the lemma by Lu et al. in [18] in
which they show that any strategyproof (that is, truthful according to our terminology) mechanism is also
partial group strategyproof. A mechanism is defined to be partial group strategyproof if for any group of
agents on the same location, each individual cannot benefit if they misreport simultaneously. Formally,
given a non-empty set S ⊂ N , profile x = (xS ,x−S) where xS = (x, . . . , x) for some x, and some
misreported locations x′S it holds that for any i ∈ S:
costi(M(xS ,x−S) ≤ costi(M(x′S ,x−S)).
If there had been some beneficial deviation of some xi to x′i in M ′ then there must have been some
deviation of the coalition (xi, xi) to (x′i, x′i) inM , in contradiction to partial group strategyproofness.
The next observation shows that any lower bound the maximum cost proven with a location profile
with n agents also holds for any profile with n + 1 agents. Clearly this observation can be applied
repeatedly to show a lower bound for an arbitrary amount of agents.
Observation 2. Let M be a truthful mechanism which has an additive error of ǫ for any profile with
n+1 agents for the maximum cost. Then there exists some truthful mechanism M ′ which has an additive
error of ǫ for the the maximum, for any profile with n agents.
Proof. LetM ′ be the mechanism which simulatesM based on the location profile for which the last agent
is placed together the penultimate agent. That is, for some input xA = (xA1 , . . . , xAn ), M ′ creates the
profile xB =
(
xB1 = x
A
1 , x
B
2 = x
A
2 , . . . , x
B
n = x
A
n , x
B
n+1 = x
A
n
)
and locates the facilities on M ′(xA) =
M(xB).
Proof of truthfulness and the additive error follows the same lines as the previous observation –
Truthfulness holds due to to partial group strategy proofness in M . The maximum error of M and M ′ is
the same since the outputted location is the same (M ′(xA) = M(xB)) and the set of the locations in the
inputs (the distinct locations in xA,xB) are the same.
3 Locating a Single Facility
3.1 Randomized Mechanisms
For the single facility problem, Procaccia and Tennenholtz introduced the LRC (left-right-center) mech-
anism, which chooses xL and xR with probability 14 each, and chooses xC with probability
1
2 [23]. They
further showed that LRC is truthful-in-expectation and achieves a tight bound for the multiplicative ratio.
It is easy to see that LRC achieves an additive error of 14 (for the location profile x = (0, 1)).
We start by showing a randomized lower bound of 16 . We match this bound with a mechanism which
extends LRC (called Balanced-LRC or BLRC in short).
The following two definitions set the foundations for the proof of the lower bound.
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Definition 3 (5-point mechanism). For an arbitrary location profile x, a 5-point mechanism M is one
which can only assign a positive probability to a subset of the following 5 points: 0, xL, xC , xR, 1.
We denote the probabilities that M locates the facilities on these points as p0, pL, pC , pR, p1 respec-
tively.
Definition 4 (Symmetric 5-point mechanism).
A 5-point mechanism M is termed symmetric if for any location profile x such that x = 1 − x it holds
that pL = pR and p0 = p1.
Theorem 5. Any randomized truthful in expectation mechanism for locating one facility has an additive
error of at least 16 for the maximum cost.
Proof. We present a lower bound for two agents. First, we show that any truthful in expectation mech-
anism for 2 agents can be replaced with a 5-point truthful in expectation mechanism while conserving
the additive error. Then, we show that we can further restrict ourselves to symmetric 5-point mechanism
without increasing the additive error. This characterization is used by a pair of location profiles and a
transition between them, yielding the lower bound. Finally, due to Observation 2, this lower bound can be
extended to an arbitrary amount of agents - for any number of agents n there does not exist a mechanism
with a lower additive error than 16 .
Lemma 6. If there exists a truthful in expectation mechanism M which has additive error α for the
maximum cost for 2 agents, then there exists a truthful in expectation 5-point mechanism M ′ which also
has additive error α for the maximum cost for 2 agents.
Proof. The proof will transform M to M ′ by moving the probability that M allocated to any point z,
to the left and right neighbors of z from the set A = {0, xL, xC , xR, 1}, without changing the expected
location. The resulting mechanism will clearly be a 5-point mechanism, and the following claims will
show that it also preserves truthfulness and the additive error. We start by showing the effect of this
transformation on an arbitrary deterministic mechanism M1.
For some arbitrary point z, let z1, z2 be its left and right neighbors, respectively, from the set A, that
is:
z1 = argmax
x∈A
(x ≤ z)
z2 = argmin
x∈A
(x ≥ z)
Let Z be the random variable which can take two possible values, z1 and z2, such that E[Z] = z (that
is Pr(M2(x) = z1) = z2−zz2−z1 , P r(M2(x) = z2) =
z−z1
z2−z1
). For some location profile x, let M1 be the
deterministic mechanism which locates the facility at point z, and let M2 be the randomized mechanism
which locates the facility according to the random variable Z .
Claim 7. For any p ∈ [0, z1] ∪ [z2, 1], the cost of p under M1 is the same as its cost under M2, that is:
costp(M1,x) = costp(M2,x).
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that p ≤ z1 < z2. The cost of p under M1 is: costp(M1,x) =
|p−M1(x)| = z − p.
On the other hand, the cost under M2 is:
costp(M2,x) = E|Z − p| =
z2 − z
z2 − z1
(z1 − p) +
z − z1
z2 − z1
(z2 − p)
=
z2 − z
z2 − z1
(z1 − p) +
z − z1
z2 − z1
[(z2 − z1) + (z1 − p)]
= (z1 − p) +
z − z1
z2 − z1
(z2 − z1) = z − p
Thus, both costs are the same.
Claim 8. For any p ∈ [0, 1], the cost of p under M1 is less than or equal to its cost under M2:
costp(M1,x) ≤ costp(M2,x).
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Proof. The cost under M1 is clearly costp(M1,x) = |p− z|.
For M2 it holds that:
costp(M2,x) = E|Z − p| ≥ |E[p− Z]| = |p− E[Z]| = |p− z|
This holds due to Jensen’s inequality (for any convex function f and random variable Z: f(E[Z]) ≤
E(f(Z))), since the absolute value is a convex function.
These two claims and truthfulness of M1 collectively show that if M1 was truthful, then so is M2:
let x be a location profile, and let x′ be the profile after deviation of some xi ∈ {xL, xR} to x′i. Then:
costxi(M2,x) = costxi(M1,x) ≤ costx′i(M1,x) ≤ costx′i(M2,x).
Claim 9. The maximum cost of x under M1 is equal to the maximum cost under M2.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that z ≤ xC . Therefore, xR incurs the maximum cost under
M1, and this cost is xR − z. Due to Claim 7, this is also the cost of xR under M2. Since in M2 the
probability is split only between points xL, xC (if xL < z ≤ xC ) or points 0, xL (if 0 ≤ z ≤ xL), then
clearly the agent with the maximum cost in M2 is xR.
To conclude the proof of the lemma, it is only necessary to repeat the above process for any point
z /∈ A which is chosen with a positive probability.
We now show that we can restrict ourselves to symmetric 5 point mechanisms.
Lemma 10. For any truthful in expectation 5-point mechanism M1 which has an additive error α, there
exists a truthful in expectation symmetric 5-point mechanism M2 which also has an additive error of α.
Proof. Let M1 be an arbitrary truthful 5-point mechanism which achieves an additive error α. We will
define a mechanism M3, and use it to construct a truthful in expectation symmetric mechanism M2.
We start by defining M3. For an arbitrary profile x denote the probabilities M1 chooses for
0, xL, xC , xR, 1 as p
1
0, p
1
L, p
1
C , p
1
R, p
1
1 respectively. Let M3 be a 5-point mechanism which does the fol-
lowing: For an arbitrary profile 1−x, M3 locates the facility based on points 0, 1−xR, 1−xC , 1−xL, 1
with the following probabilities: p30 = p11, p3L = p1R, p3C = p1C , p3R = p1L and p31 = p10 (notice that the
leftmost and rightmost points in 1 − x are 1 − xR and 1 − xL respectively). In some sense M3 can be
seen as the “anti-symmetric” mechanism of M1.
M3 is truthful – Assume towards a contradiction otherwise, that is, there exists some x and a ben-
eficial deviation to x′. Then, the deviation from 1 − x to 1 − x′ would have been beneficial in M1, in
contradiction to the fact that M1 is truthful. Additionally, following the same logic, the maximum cost
of M3 is equal to that of M1 (for any profile x in M3 with error α, the profile 1− x has an error of α in
M1).
Let M2 be the mechanism which runs M1 and M3 with probability 0.5 each. M2 is a probability
distribution over truthful mechanisms, therefore it is necessarily truthful. Also, the maximum cost is the
same in M1,M3, and it is therefore also the maximal cost in M2. Finally, by the construction of M2 it is
clearly a symmetric 5-point mechanism.
Now that we have proven that we can focus only on symmetric 5-point mechanisms, we present two
location profiles and a transition between them which concludes the proof.
Let xA = (13 ,
2
3 ) and xB = (0,
2
3 ) be two location profiles. LetM be a symmetric 5-point mechanism
which achieves the optimal additive error.
For profile xA, let the probability of locating the facility on the left (that is 1/3) be pALR and the
probability of locating the facility in the center point (that is 1/2) be pAC . Since the instance is symmetric,
the probability of locating the facility on the right point (2/3) will also be pALR and the probability of
locating the facility at 0 and likewise at 1 is pA01 = 1/2− pALR −
pA
C
2 .
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We have that the cost of the agent located at the left is equal to:
cost1/3(A) = p
A
01
(
1
3
+
2
3
)
+
pALR
3
+
pAC
6
= pA01 +
pALR
3
+
pAC
6
= 1/2− pALR − p
A
C/2 + p
A
LR/3 + p
A
C/6
=
1
2
−
pAC
3
−
2pALR
3
We now consider the profile B. The additive error of the profile is equal to
E[max{|X |, |X −
2
3
|}]−
1
3
= E|X −
1
3
| = cost1/3(B).
However, since the mechanism is truthful it holds that
cost1/3(A) ≤ cost1/3(B).
If we assume towards a contradiction that M can achieve an additive error of less than 16 , we have that
cost1/3(B) < 16 and consequently cost1/3(A) < 1/6. This implies that
1
2 −
pA
C
3 −
2pA
LR
3 <
1
6 which gives
pAC + 2p
A
LR > 1. This is contradiction since in profile A probabilities must sum to 1.
We now present a new mechanism, and show that it can achieve a matching upper bound of 1/6:
Definition 11 (BLRC mechanism).
The balanced left-right-center (BLRC) mechanism locates the facility at the point 12 with probability 13 ,
and deploys the LRC mechanism with probability 23 . More explicitly, BLRC locates the facility according
to the following distribution:
1
2
, w.p.
1
3
; xL w.p.
1
6
; xR w.p.
1
6
; xC w.p.
1
3
Theorem 12. BLRC is truthful in expectation, and achieves an additive error of at most 16 for the maxi-
mum cost.
Proof. BLRC is based on two truthful-in-expectation mechanisms – LRC was proven to be truthful in
expectation in [23], and locating the facility on the fixed point 1/2 is clearly truthful as the agents have
no influence over the result. Therefore taking a distribution over these two mechanisms is also truthful in
expectation.
Proof of the approximation ratio will be based on two lemmas:
Lemma 13. Let x, y be points such that: 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, and let x,x′ be the following two location
profiles: x = (x, y) and x′ = (0, y − x). Then δBLRC(x) ≤ δBLRC(x′).
Proof. For the profile x, the optimal mechanism locates the facility at x+y2 and its cost is y−x2 . The
maximum cost of BLRC in this case is: 13 · (y−x)+
1
3
y−x
2 +
1
3 · (max{|y−1/2|, |x−1/2|}). Therefore
the additive error is: δBLRC(x) = max{|y−1/2|,|x−1/2|}3 .
For the profile x′ the cost of the optimal mechanism remains y−x2 , but the cost of BLRC is:
1
3 (y −
x) + 13 ·
y−x
2 +
1
3 ·
1
2 . Therefore: δBLRC(x
′) = 1/6.
For any x, y ∈ [0, 1] it holds that 12 ≥ max{|y − 1/2|, |x − 1/2|}, therefore: δBLRC(x
′) −
δBLRC(x) =
1
3 (
1
2 −max{|y − 1/2|, |x− 1/2|}) ≥ 0.
Lemma 14. For any z ∈ [0, 1], let x = (0, z). It holds that the additive error of BLRC for x is 1/6:
δBLRC(x) =
1
6 .
Proof. Given the location profile x, the optimal mechanism locates the facility at z/2 at a maximum cost
of z/2. The cost of BLRC is: MC(BLRC,x) = 13 (z) +
1
3 ·
z
2 +
1
3 ·
1
2 .
Therefore, the additive error is: δBLRC(x) = 13 ·
z
2 +
1
3 · (
1
2 −
z
2 ) =
1
3 ·
1
2 =
1
6 .
Lemma 13 holds for an arbitrary location profile x with xL = x, xR = y, and Lemma 14 holds for an
arbitrary z, and in particular z = y−x, so the error of BLRC with two agents is no more than 1/6. Since
the maximum cost always occurs in at least one of the two extreme reports, combining the two lemmata
is sufficient to complete the proof for an arbitrary number of agents as well. 
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3.2 Deterministic Mechanisms
We move on to prove a lower bound of 1/4 and a matching upper bound. Recognize that any dictatorship
has an additive error of 1/2, by considering x = (0, 1).
Theorem 15. Any deterministic truthful mechanism M has an additive error of at least 14 for the maxi-
mum cost.
Proof. We first deal with the case where there are two agents, and later extend to an arbitrary number of
agents.
Let x = (0, 1). Assume without loss of generality that M(x) = 1/2 + ǫ for some ǫ ≥ 0. Let
x
′ = (0, 1/2 + ǫ). The optimum for x′ is achieved at 1/4 + ǫ/2. Therefore, if the mechanism is to
achieve an additive error of less than 1/4, it must locate the facility in (0, 1/2 + ǫ/2). But if this were
the case, then the agent at 1/2 + ǫ could benefit by misreporting to 1, which would move the facility
precisely to 1/2 + ǫ, contradicting truthfulness.
For the case of more than two agents, consider the profile in which all other agents are precisely at
1/2, and repeat the process above.
This lower bound construction works in similar lines to the lower bound of Theorem 2.2 in [23].
We now present a matching upper bound, a truthful mechanism additive error of 14 .
Definition 16 (Phantom-half). For any profile x where xL, xR are the leftmost and rightmost locations,
M locates the facility on the median of the following 3 points: xL, xR, 0.5.
The name of this mechanism is inspired by the notion of phantom-voters (in this case - the phantom
voter is 0.5) as introduced in [20].
Theorem 17. Phantom-half is truthful and has an additive error of 14 for the maximum cost.
Proof. It is easy to see that by misreporting, any agent can either not affect the location of the facility, or
move it farther away from them.
For the additive error:
– If xL, xR ≤ 1/2: The optimal mechanism locates the facility at xL+xR2 for a maximum cost of
xR−xL
2 .
Phantom-half locates the facility at xR for a cost of xR−xL. The additive error is: xR−xL2 ≤
1/2
2 =
1
4 .
– If xL ≤ 1/2, xR ≥ 1/2: Assume without loss of generality that 1/2− xL ≥ xR − 1/2. The optimal
mechanism locates the facility at xL+xR2 for a maximum cost of
xR−xL
2 . Phantom-half locates the
facility at 1/2 for a cost of 1/2− xL. The additive error is: (1/2− xL)− xR−xL2 =
1−xL−xR
2 . Since
xR ≥ 1/2, xL ≥ 0 it holds that: 1−xL−xR2 ≤
1
4 .
– If xL, xR > 1/2: This is completely symmetric to the first case.
4 Extension to Many Facilities
We start by showing a trivial deterministic mechanism, Equal Spread, which achieves an error of no more
than 12k−1 for both the average cost and the maximum cost. We then show a lower bound of
1
6k for the
maximum cost, meaning the bound is Θ( 1k ).
Afterwards we show two extensions of Equal Spread - PEC, a randomized mechanism which reaches
an error of 14k−2 for both max-cost and average cost, and EPEC, a deterministic mechanism which reaches
an error of 38k−4 for the average cost.
Finally, we show that for the case of 2 facilities, we can improve the bound of EPEC for the average
cost from 1/4 to 1/5 by choosing the “fifths” mechanism, which locates the facilities on the 0.2 and 0.8
percentiles.
Definition 18 (Equal Spread mechanism). The Equal Spread mechanism locates the k facilities on i2k−1for odd values of i (such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1).
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Theorem 19. Equal spread is a deterministic mechanism which achieves an additive error of no more
than 12k−1 for both the average cost and the maximum cost.
Proof. Trivial - Clearly, for any point p ∈ [0, 1], p is located at a distance of at most 12k−1 to the closest
facility.
Theorem 20. Any deterministic truthful mechanism M for locating k facilities has an additive error of
at least 16k for the maximum cost.
Proof. The proof separates k − 1 agents far away from one another, and then uses the proof of Theorem
15, except on a smaller interval.
Let x = (xj)k+1j=1 be the following location profile: let x1 = 0, x2 = 23k and for every 3 ≤ i ≤ k+1:
let xi = i−1k . An optimal mechanism can locate k − 1 facilities on {x3, x4, . . . xk+1}, and locate one
facility on the midpoint of x1, x2 (that is, on 13k ), for a maximum cost of 13k .
Any mechanism with an error lower than 16k must also designate one facility to the interval in the
vicinity of every one of the k − 1 agents on x3 . . . xk+1: If there exists some 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 such that
there are no facilities in the segment ( i−1/2k ,
i+1/2
k ) or no facilities on (
k−1/2
k , 1] then there exists an
agent located at least 1/2k from a facility, therefore the error would be at least:
1/2
k −
1
3k =
1
6k .
Additionally, any mechanism with an error not larger than 16k must also designate one facility serve
the first two agents (x1, x2): If there are no facilities in the segment [0, 1k ] then the error is at least
1
k − 0 >
1
6k .
Assume without loss of generality that the remaining facility is put at point 13k + ǫ for some ǫ ≥ 0.
Let x′ be the location profile in for any j 6= 2: x′j = xj and x′2 = 13k + ǫ. The aforementioned arguments
also dictate that for any M with error less than 16k , in x
′ then x′1, x′2 are also designated one facility (that
is, there is a facility in the segment [0, 1k ]). In profile x′ the cost of the optimal mechanism is 16k + ǫ/2.
For any M with error less than 16k the facility must be located in the segment (ǫ/2,
1
3k + ǫ/2). But if this
were the case, then agent x′2 could benefit by misreporting to 23k (and then the facility would have been
located precisely on it), contradicting truthfulness.
We propose a randomized mechanism called PEC which extends this basic idea.
Definition 21 (Paired-Equal-Cost (PEC) mechanism). The paired-equal-cost mechanism locates the k
facilities in the following locations, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1:
M(x) =
{
{0, 22k−1 ,
4
2k−1 , . . . ,
2k
2k−1} w.p.
1
2
{ 12k−1 ,
3
2k−1 ,
5
2k−1 , . . . , 1} w.p.
1
2
Theorem 22. PEC is a truthful in expectation randomized mechanism which has an additive error of
1
4k−2 for the average cost.
Proof. PEC is clearly truthful since the reports have no effect over the outcome.
We show the additive error by bounding the additive error of an arbitrary agent located at point xi
from above by 14k−2 . Let
j
2k−1 ≤ xi <
j+1
2k−1 for some j
1
. Therefore, the closest facility to the agent will
be either j2k−1 or
j+1
2k−1 , each with probability 0.5. Denote xi =
j
2k−1 + ǫ for some 0 ≤ ǫ <
1
2k−1 . The
expected cost of the agent will be: 0.5
(
|xi −
j
2k−1 |+ |
j+1
2k−1 − xi|
)
= 0.5(ǫ+ 12k−1 − ǫ) =
1
4k−2 .
For the deterministic case we introduce election-parity-equal-cost (EPEC). Like in PEC, facilities
there are two options - locating facilities on { i2k−1} for even or odd values of i. In order to decide
whether to choose the even or odd values, the mechanism counts the amount of agents who prefer each
option (based on their reports), and decides based on majority (ties can be broken arbitrarily).
Theorem 23. EPEC is truthful, and achieves an error of 38k−4 for the average cost.
1It is easy to verify that for xi = 1 the cost is 1
4k−2
.
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Proof. EPEC is truthful — the agents have 2 options to choose from, and the decision is done based on
majority, therefore no agent has an incentive to misreport to a position which prefers the other option.
Any misreport which remains within the same option (for instance, declaring x′i at location xi, where
both xi, x′i are closest to i2k−1 for even i) does not affect the result.
The cost of any agent who voted for the option which was chosen is at most 12(2k−1) . The cost of any
agent is at most 12k−1 . Since we chose based on majority, the error is at most:
1
n
[
n
2
(
1
4k − 2
)
+
n
2
(
1
2k − 1
)]
=
3
8k − 4
For the case of two facilities (k = 2), we can further improve the result of EPEC:
Definition 24 (Fifths mechanism). Let x be the location profile in ascending order. The fifths mechanism
locates the 2 facilities on reports xn/5 and x4n/5.
Theorem 25. The fifths mechanism is truthful and has an error 15 for the average cost.
The proof is deferred to the appendix.
5 Discussion and Open Problems
We examine the problem of truthful facility location under additive errors. We proved tight bounds for
one facility, and showed several extensions for multiple facilities.
We believe that there are many interesting directions which were explored for the multiplicative error
but remain wide open for the additive error. For instance, exploring additional metric spaces (cycles,
trees, etc.), different objective functions (e.g., L2) or other cost functions of the agents (e.g. “obnoxious
facility location”. In addition, other models can also be researched with this error function in mind, for
example voting via mediators (see [5]) or when voting for a discrete set of candidates (see [10]).
Acknowledgements. We wish to thank Prof. Michal Feldman and Prof. Amos Fiat for their helpful
suggestions.
References
[1] Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Strategyproof approxi-
mation mechanisms for location on networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:0907.2049, 2009.
[2] Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Walking in circles.
Discrete Mathematics, 310(23):3432–3435, 2010.
[3] Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, and John Postl. Approximating optimal social choice under
metric preferences. In AAAI, volume 15, pages 777–783. Citeseer, 2015.
[4] Elliot Anshelevich and John Postl. Randomized social choice functions under metric preferences.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.07590, 2015.
[5] Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Mechanism design with strategic me-
diators. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4(2):7, 2016.
[6] Qingpeng Cai, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Aris Filos, and Pingzhong Tang. Facility location with minimax
envy.
[7] Yukun Cheng, Wei Yu, and Guochuan Zhang. Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an
obnoxious facility game on networks. Theoretical Computer Science, 497:154–163, 2013.
[8] Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, and Ilan Nehama. Mechanism design on discrete lines
and cycles. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 423–440.
ACM, 2012.
11
[9] Itai Feigenbaum and Jay Sethuraman. Strategyproof mechanisms for one-dimensional hybrid and
obnoxious facility location models. In Workshops at the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 2015.
[10] Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, and Iddan Golomb. On voting and facility location. In Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’16, Maastricht, The Netherlands,
July 24-28, 2016, pages 269–286, 2016.
[11] Michal Feldman and Yoav Wilf. Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective.
In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 873–890. ACM,
2013.
[12] Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Minming Li, Jie Zhang, and Qiang Zhang. Facility location with double-peaked
preferences. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
893–899. AAAI Press, 2015.
[13] Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos. Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple
facility location games. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pages
234–245. Springer, 2010.
[14] Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos. Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions.
In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 435–452. ACM,
2013.
[15] Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos. On the power of deterministic mechanisms for facility
location games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2(4):15, 2014.
[16] Stephen Gross, Elliot Anshelevich, and Lirong Xia. Vote until two of you agree: Mechanisms with
small distortion and sample complexity. 2017.
[17] Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages
617–631, 1973.
[18] Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, and Zeyuan Allen Zhu. Asymptotically optimal strategy-
proof mechanisms for two-facility games. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic
commerce, pages 315–324. ACM, 2010.
[19] Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, and Yuan Zhou. Tighter bounds for facility games. In Internet and Network
Economics, pages 137–148. Springer, 2009.
[20] Herve´ Moulin. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4):437–455, 1980.
[21] Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Approximately optimal mechanism
design via differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 3rd innovations in theoretical computer science
conference, pages 203–213. ACM, 2012.
[22] Ariel D Procaccia and Jeffrey S Rosenschein. The distortion of cardinal preferences in voting. In
International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, pages 317–331. Springer, 2006.
[23] Ariel D Procaccia and Moshe Tennenholtz. Approximate mechanism design without money. In
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 177–186. ACM, 2009.
[24] Ariel D Procaccia, David Wajc, and Hanrui Zhang. Approximation-variance tradeoffs in mechanism
design.
[25] James Schummer and Rakesh V Vohra. Strategy-proof location on a network. Journal of Economic
Theory, 104(2):405–428, 2002.
[26] Paolo Serafino and Carmine Ventre. Truthful mechanisms without money for non-utilitarian het-
erogeneous facility location. In AAAI, pages 1029–1035, 2015.
12
[27] Xin Sui and Craig Boutilier. Approximately strategy-proof mechanisms for (constrained) facility
location. In Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
agent Systems, pages 605–613. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, 2015.
[28] Shaokun Zou and Minming Li. Facility location games with dual preference. 2015.
13

ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
00
52
9v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 Ja
n 2
01
7
A Analysis of the Fifths mechanism
Both facilities are chosen based on the percentiles of the agents. The mechanism is truthful – for each agent and each
of the two facilities, misreporting can either not affect the location of the facility, or cause it to be located farther from
the agent.
For a given location profile, if the amount of agents is not a multiple of 5, we analyze the case in which we duplicate
the location of each agent 5 times. As shown in Observation 1,this does not affect the additive error. We denote the
new location profile by x.
Let OPT1 < OPT2 be the locations of the two facilities in some optimal mechanism. Let F1 = x1/5, F2 = x4n/5
be the locations of the two facilities in the fifths mechanism.
We split the proof to different cases:
1. OPT1 ∈ [0, F1) and OPT2 ∈ (F2, 1]: We show that this case is not possible.
In the single facility case, the optimal mechanism locates the facility on the median. Therefore, in the two facility
case the optimal mechanism divide the agents into two groups: A = {x1, . . . xk} and B = {xk+1 . . . xn}, and
locates the OPT1, OPT2 on the median of groups A and B respectively.
Therefore, either A or B contains at least half of the agents. Assume without loss of generality that |A| ≥ n/2.
Therefore there exist at least n/4 agents to the left of the median of OPT1, so OPT1 ≥ F1 ⇒ OPT1 /∈ [0, F1).
2. If OPT1, OPT2 ∈ [F1, F2]: In this case we show a series of transitions from x to a different location profile
(without changing the location of F1 and F2) whose additive error can only be greater. We show that the additive
error of the new profile is not greater than 0.2.
We now show the transitions, and prove that in each case the difference in the additive error is non-negative.
In each step i we denote the current location profile by xi (in the initial stage:x0 = x). For some agent j
let βij , γij be the difference in the costs of the agent at stage i under M and under OPT respectively, that is:
βij = costxj (M,x
i)− costxj (M,x
i−1) and γij = costxj (OPT,xi)− costxj (OPT,xi−1). The total difference
in the additive error in step i is denoted by ∆i =
∑
j(β
i
j − γ
i
j). We show that ∀i : ∆i ≥ 0. We measure the
error based on the fixed locations OPT1, OPT2, and if the optimal mechanism changes, this makes difference
in additive error even higher.
Let C = F1+F22 , and assume without loss of generality that |C − OPT1| ≥ |C − OPT2|. We analyze the
following transitions (see Figure 1):
(a) x1: Move all agents in [0, F1) to F1: In this case all agents which move get closer to OPT1 by the same
amount that they get closer to F1, that is β1j − γ1j . Let:
x1j =
{
F1 if xj ∈ [0, F1)
xj otherwise
The change in the additive error is: ∆1 =
∑
j(β
1
j − γ
1
j ) =
∑
j:xj<F1
(β1j − γ
1
j ) = 0.
(b) x2: Move all agents in (F2, 1] to F2: In this case all agents which move get closer to OPT2 by the same
amount that they get closer to F2, that is β2j − γ2j . Let:
x2j =
{
F2 if x1j ∈ (F2, 1]
x1j otherwise
The change in the additive error is: ∆2 =
∑
j(β
2
j − γ
2
j ) =
∑
j:xj>F2
(β2j − γ
2
j ) = 0.
(c) x3: Move all agents in (F1, F2) to OPT2: In this case each agent j which moves distance δj , reduces the
cost of OPT by δj and reduces the cost of M by no more than δj , therefore ∀j : β3j ≥ γ3j . Let:
x3j =
{
OPT2 if x2j ∈ (F1, F2)
x2j otherwise
The change in the additive error is: ∆3 =
∑
j(β
3
j − γ
3
j ) =
∑
j:F1<xj<F2
(β3j − γ
3
j ) ≥ 0.
(d) x4: Scale the segment [F1, F2] to [0, 1]. Notice that in x3 all agents are within the segment [F1, F2]. The
scaling increases all the distances between agents by the same factor, so the additive error of any agent will
also increase (by that factor): ∀j : β4j − γ4j ≥ 0. Let D = 1F2−F1 ≥ 1 and let:
x4j =
x3j − F1
F2 − F1
For every agent j it holds that β4j = D · β3j and γ4j = D · γ3j . The change in the additive error is therefore:
∆4 =
∑
j(β
4
j − γ
4
j ) = D ·
∑
j(β
3
j − γ
3
j ) ≥ 0.
Figure 1: The transitions from profile x to x3:
F1 OPT1 OPT2 F2
At the end of the process the profile is x4. The highest additive error in x4 is reached in the following configu-
ration (see Figure 2): when there are n/5 agents at 0, 3n/5 agents at some point x (the location of OPT2), and
n/5 agents at point 1. We now assess the error with respect to the new assignment of OPT (that is, moving
OPT1 to 0), which can only increase the additive error. Assume without loss of generality that x ≥ 1/2.
In this case, OPT1 = 0, OPT2 = x. The costs are AC(OPT ) = 1−x5 and AC(M) =
3(1−x)
5 . Since x ≥ 1/2
the additive error is: 3(1−x)5 −
1−x
5 =
2(1−x)
5 ≤
1
5 .
Figure 2: The location profile x4
0
F1 = OPT1
n/5
x
OPT2
3n/5
1
F2
n/5
3. If OPT1 ∈ [0, F1) and OPT2 ∈ [F1, F2].
Similarly to the previous case, we show a series of transitions which does not decrease the additive error (see
Figure 3). We denote the location profiles with brackets (e.g., x(1)) do distinguish the notation from the previous
case.
(a) x(1): Move all agents in [0, F1) to OPT1: In this case the additive error does not change for all agents in
[0, OPT1] ∪ [F1, 1], and the error increases for agents in (OPT1, F1). Let:
x
(1)
j =
{
OPT1 if xj ∈ [0, F1)
xj otherwise
The change in the additive error is: ∆(1) =
∑
j(β
(1)
j − γ
(1)
j ) =
∑
j:OPT1<xj<F1
(β
(1)
j − γ
(1)
j ) ≥ 0.
(b) x(2): Move all agents in (F1, F2) to OPT2: In this case each agent j which moves distance δj to OPT2,
reduces the cost of OPT by δj and reduces the cost of M by no more than δj , therefore ∀j : β(2)j ≥ γ
(2)
j .
Let:
x
(2)
j =
{
OPT2 if x(1)j ∈ (F1, F2)
x
(1)
j otherwise
Figure 3: The transitions from profile x to x(3):
OPT1 F1 OPT2 F2
The change in the additive error is: ∆(2) =
∑
j(β
(2)
j − γ
(2)
j ) =
∑
j:F1<xj<F2
(β
(2)
j − γ
(2)
j ) ≥ 0.
(c) x(3): Move all agents in (F2, 1] to F2. In this case all agents which move get closer to OPT2 by the same
amount that they get closer to F2, that is β2j − γ2j . Let:
x
(3)
j =
{
F2 if x(2)j ∈ (F2, 1]
x
(2)
j otherwise
The change in the additive error is: ∆(3) =
∑
j(β
(3)
j − γ
(3)
j ) =
∑
j:F2<xj≤1
(β
(3)
j − γ
(3)
j ) = 0.
(d) x(4): Scale [OPT1, F2] to [0, 1]. Notice that in x(3) all agents are within the segment [OPT1, F2]. The
scaling increases all the distances between agents by the same factor, so the additive error of any agent will
also increase (by that factor): ∀j : β(4)j − γ(4)j ≥ 0. Let D′ = 1F2−OPT1 ≥ 1 and let:
x
(4)
j =
x
(3)
j −OPT1
F2 −OPT1
For every agent j it holds that β(4)j = D′ · β
(3)
j and γ
(4)
j = D
′ · γ
(3)
j . The change in the additive error is
therefore: ∆(4) =
∑
j(β
(4)
j − γ
(4)
j ) = D
′ ·
∑
j(β
(4)
j − γ
(4)
j ) ≥ 0.
Figure 4: The location profile x(4)
0
OPT1
n/5
F1
1
1− x− y
OPT2
3n/5
y
1
F2
n/5
x
At the end of the process, the highest additive error is reached in x(4) in the following configuration (see Figure
4) when there are n/5 agents at point 0 (location of OPT1), one agent at F1, 3n/5 agents at OPT2 and n/5
agents at point 1 (location of F2). We denote the distances x = F2 − OPT2, y = OPT2 − F1 and therefore
F1 = 1− x− y. Denote the cost of the agent at F1 by α.
In this case cost(OPT ) = x/5 + α ≥ x/5 and cost(M) = 3·min{x,y}5 +
1−x−y
5 . Therefore the additive error is
1
5 (1 + 3min{x, y} − (2x+ y)) ≤ 1/5.
4. If OPT1 ∈ [F1, F2] and OPT2 ∈ (F2, 1]: Completely symmetric to the previous case.
